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Abstract 
In this paper, I examine the problem of matching or assigning a fixed set of goods or 
services to a fixed set of agents. I characterize the social choice correspondences that can 
be implemented in dominant and Nash strategies when transfers are not allowed. This 
is an extension of the literature that was begun by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite
(1975), who independently proved that if a mechanism is nonmanipulable it is dictato­
rial. For the classes of mechanisms that are described in the paper, the results imply that 
the only mechanisms that are implementable in dominant and Nash strategies are choice 
mechanisms that rely only on ordinal rankings. I also describe a subclass of mechanisms 
that are Pareto optimal. In addition, the results explain the modeling conventions found 
in the literature - that when nontransfer mechanisms are studied individuals are en­
dowed with ordinal preferences, and when transfer mechanisms are studied individuals 
are endowed with cardinal preferences. 
'I would like to thank John Ledyard for his valuable help and comments; as usual. he is absolved 
from any responsibility in the accuracy of this paper 
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1. Introduction
Many allocation problems involve the assignment or matching of a. set of indi­
viduals to a. set of objects. This allocation problem appears in a. variety of settings. A 
school administrator assigns office space to faculty members. A university computer 
group administers computer resources. A space agency schedules antenna. time to space­
craft. All these allocation problems have two properties in common: the task of 
matching one group to another and the institutional feature that money is not used. 
Most of the research on matching problems has concentrated on the two-sided 
matching problem or marriage problem ma.de famous by Ga.le and Shapley (1962), 
(Roth and Sotomayor (1989) provide a.n extensive review). In two-sided matching 
problems, members of one group a.re to form partnerships with a. member of another 
group and members of ea.ch group have preferences for members of the opposite group. 
A common example is the matching of sports tea.ms and players. 
In this pa.per, we examine the problem of matching or assigning a. fixed set of 
goods or services, which we will generically call slots, to a. fixed set of a.gents. We 
consider the problem from the point of view of a. planner who wishes to design a. set of 
rules or procedures (usually called a. mechanism), the outcomes of which satisfy certain 
criteria.  This problem is generally known a.s one-sided matching or the assignment 
problem. In one-sided matching problems, only one of the groups have preferences for 
members of the other group. An example of one-sided matching is the matching of 
office space and faculty members. The research on the one-sided matching problem has 
tended to propose rules and procedures and is generally found in the operations research 
literature. Two general classes of mechanisms a.re a.va.ila.ble to solve this problem: 
mechanisms that use transfers and mechanisms that do not use transfers. In this pa.per, 
we a.re concerned with mechanisms that do not use transfers. 
We extend the literature that was begun by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite 
(1975), who independently proved that if a. mechanism is nonma.nipula.ble it is 
dictatorial. A planner is interested in nonma.nipula.ble rules since many rules require 
knowledge of individual preferences or information. These preferences a.re privately 
known and it may not be in the best interest of individuals to truthfully reveal their 
private information (or preferences) to the planner. That is, a.gents may be a.hie to 
manipulate the outcome by misrepresenting their preferences. Manipulation may result 
in unsatisfactory outcomes; so the planner would like to know what mechanisms a.re 
manipulable and to what extent. 
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The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (hereafter G-S) establishes that a voting 
scheme (mechanism) must be either manipulable or dictatorial when all possible 
transitive orderings over the set of alternatives are allowed, and the set of alternatives is 
finite. Results by Barbera and Peleg (1990), Moreno and Walker (1990), Satterthwaite 
and Sonnenschein (1981), and Zhou (1990b) establish the Gibbard-Satterthwaite result 
when the domain of preferences is restricted. Barbera and Peleg show that a G-S result 
holds when preferences are required to be continuous, and the set of alternatives is a 
metric space (not necessarily a subset of 3rn). Moreno and Walker add the restriction 
that some dimensions of the social decision do not affect all the participants. Zhou 
establishes a G-S-type result in economies with public goods when the set of admissible 
preferences are continuous and convex. For domain restrictions that typically satisfy 
economic models Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) (hereafter SS) provide a result 
similar to the G-S result. The SS environment requires a condition called nonbossy for 
a serial dictatorship to hold. The results of these papers indicate that there may not 
exist "satisfactory" mechanisms without the use of monetary transfers or other incentive 
tax schemes. Common incentive schemes that do not use money are waiting in line, 
inspection, and punishment. 
Our environment differs from the previous environments in two ways: 1) by the 
restriction on the allocation space, and 2) by the restriction on the domain of 
preferences. In the problem I pose, allocations that a planner may make are constrained 
by two requirements: a feasibility constraint (at most one slot is assigned to each 
agent), and the institutional requirement (incentive taxes such as "money" or waiting in 
line cannot be used to allocate slots, and lotteries over the alternatives are not allowed). 
This problem will be referred to as the one-sided matching problem (also known as the 
assignment problem).1 
The domain of preferences is restricted by the assumption that individuals are 
selfish and that their utility does not depend on the slots allocated to others. This 
restricted domain of preferences does not satisfy the conditions for the proof of the G-S 
result. For instance, Barbera and Peleg's proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 
requires that preferences having a single best alternative are not excluded from the 
domain; in our environment there are no preferences that have a single best alternative 
and individuals are indifferent over large sets of outcomes. The matching environment 
differs from the environment constructed by Moreno and Walker, since allocations to 
1 
For a more detailed discussion of the assignment problem, see Chapter 8 of Roth and Sotomayor (1989), or
Shapley and Shub;k (1972). 
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one individual can affect another individual (e.g., if person 1 is assigned slot A, then 2 
cannot be assigned this slot) . 
In the environment discussed m this paper, there are two ways an agent can 
behave "strategically." The first is by manipulating the outcome of a social choice 
function (SCF) and the second is by corrupting the outcome of a SCF. A SCF is 
manipulable if an agent can improve the outcome for himself by misrepresenting his 
true preferences, while a social choice function is corruptible if an agent can change the 
outcome to another agent without changing the outcome for himself. The .. ability of an 
agent to manipulate an outcome has been widely discussed and is the main condition 
that restricts the outcomes of the social choice functions of the papers cited above, while 
the ability of an agent to corrupt an outcome has received scant attention. Noncorrupt­
ible SCFs have been discussed by Ritz (1985) and Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein 
(1981), who call a noncorruptible mechanism nonbossy.2 
The mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature to match agents to 
goods can be classified by the message space and the allocation rule (which may be a 
procedure or algorithm) used to make the match. There are two basic types of message 
spaces: ordinal ranking and cardinal ranking. In a mechanism (the message space and 
allocation rule) that uses an ordinal ranking message space, individuals are asked to 
submit a preference ranking over slots (e.g., I like 1 better than 2, and 2 better than 3).
In a mechanism that uses a cardinal ranking message space, individuals are requested to 
choose from a subset CC�".. (e.g., 100 points must be divided among the different
slots) . 
I classify the procedures found in the literature into three categories based on 
their operational characteristics-positional, chit, and choice.3 Positional mechanisms 
are mechanisms wherein the message space is an agent's ordinal ranking over slots. 
Chit mechanisms have a cardinal message space. Choice mechanisms allow the individ­
uals to choose from an available set of slots. 
Positional mechanisms are discussed first. In a positional mechanism each agent 
submits a ranking over slots. The planner (or central coordinator) places a numerical 
value on each ranking and then determines the outcome by maximizing (or minimizing) 
2 Ritz's definition of corruptible is more general than the SS definition of bossy; Ritz defines corruptible for
choice correspondences; SS define bossy for direct mechanisms. 
3 This is not an exhaustive classification of all possible mechanisms, only of those commonly found in the
literature. 
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an objective function defined on the numerical values. Various objective functions are 
possible. For instance, agents submit rankings4 ri = (r;1, . . .  , r;k), the most preferred
good getting the highest number and so on, whereas the r's are chosen from a set of k 
specific weights W = { w1, . . .  , wk}· If W = {1, . . .  , k }, then this is similar to a Borda
count. Given a submission of ranks, the assignment is determined by the allocation 
that maximizes the sum of weights. Gardenfors (1973) shows that assignments 
generated in this fashion satisfy conditions of neutrality, symmetry, unanimity, 
monotonicity, and Pareto optimality (see Gardenfors for definitions). In section 9 we 
show that for this class of mechanisms agents have incentives to misrepresent their 
ordinal rankings over slots. 
A second type of assignment is determined by the allocation that minimizes the 
worst case (e.g., an assignment is made to make the agent with the lowest ranked slot 
as high as possible). This procedure was described by Proll (1972) and Wilson (1977). 
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) report on a similar procedure used by Harvard 
administrators in 1977 to assign students to housing. The administrators first assigned 
students to their first choice if possible; they then assigned the remaining students to 
their second choice, and so on (this is called a bottleneck procedure). Hylland and 
Zeckhauser (1979) report that the Harvard administrators believed they observed 
students acting strategically. If students believed their first choice was first among 
many others, they might list their less popular second choice as first. 5 
A second class of mechanisms includes chit mechanisms. A chit mechanism is 
one wherein the message space allows each person to allocate a certain number of points 
(or chits) to any of the items which he wishes. The only difference between chit and 
positional mechanisms is the message space. Operationally, chit mechanisms use 
"funny money" (sometimes called chits) instead of money (exchangeable currency) as 
the medium of exchange. A chit is a medium of exchange whose value is determined 
solely in the context of the given assignment problem (environment), and has no value 
for goods or services outside the assignment problem. An example of a chit mechanism 
is the implicit market mechanism of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). 
A third class of mechanisms ,includes choice mechanisms. They are similar to 
4 For some situations, when the nUinber of slots is large, asking agents to submit rankings over all slots is
impractical. Wilkonson (1972) suggests a solution where unranked slots are given a ranking one lower than the lowest 
ranked slot. 
5 See Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), page 255, note 6.
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positional mechanisms, smce they only require an individual's rankings over slots. I 
consider them separately because they can be implemented by procedures that require 
individuals to choose slots from an available set, so the entire ranking does not need to 
be obtained. Examples of choice mechanisms are the deferred-acceptance procedure and 
serial-dictatorship mechanisms. The deferred-acceptance mechanism is based on the 
Gale-Shapley algorithm used to solve the marriage problem.6 For the serial dictatorship 
an ordering of agents is chosen, the first agent chooses her slot, the second agent chooses 
her slot of those remaining, and so on. These mechanisms will be discussed in more 
detail in a later section. 
Except for the choice mechanisms, none of the literature on matching mech­
anisms explicitly considers incentive problems. 7 The only result in the matching 
environment is by Zhou (1990a) who proved that when the number of agents is greater 
than 2, there exists no mechanism that satisfies symmetry, ex ante Pareto optimality, 
and strategy-proofness. The results presented in this paper characterize the class of 
social choice rules that can be implemented when nonstrategic behavior (behavior that 
is both nonmanipulable and noncorruptible) is a condition; the properties of these rules 
are then discussed. 
In this paper we present four basic results: 1) nonstrategic rules must be ordinal; 
that is, an individual's assignment from the social choice function does not change when 
his ordinal preferences do not change; 2) nonstrategic social choice functions must be 
choice mechanisms; 3) the allocation space is rich (in the sense of Dasgupta, 
Hammond, and Maskin (1979), hereafter DHM), and hence a social choice function is 
implementable in dominant strategies if and only if it is implementable in Nash 
strategies; 4) a subclass of nonstrategic social choice functions called serial dictators are 
Pare to optimal. 
For the classes of mechanisms that we described above, the results imply that 
the only mechanisms that are implementable in dominant and Nash strategies are 
choice mechanisms that rely only on ordinal rankings. The class of mechanisms we call 
chits are not implementable since they rely on cardinal information. In addition, the 
results explain the modeling conventions found in the literature-that when non transfer 
mechanisms are studied individuals are endowed with ordinal preferences, and when 
6 See Roth and Sotomayor (1989) and the classic reference Gale and Shapley (1962). 
7 Hylland and Zeckhauser made the assumption that when there are many agents, each agent's contribution is
small and hence there is no incentive to be dishonest. 
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transfer mechanisms are studied individuals are endowed with cardinal preferences. We 
will discuss these results in the section on applications. 
This paper is divided into sections. In Section 2, we describe the formal model. 
In Section 3, strategic behavior is described. In Section 4, we show the equivalence of 
various notions of implementability for our environment. In Section 5, necessary 
conditions for dominant-strategy implementation are presented. In Section 6, the serial 
dictator 1s described and shown to characterize the class of nonstrategic rules. In 
Section 7, Nash implementation is presented. In Section 8, the optimality of 
implementable rules is presented. In Section 9, we discuss some of the results in the 
context of the categories of rules presented in the introduction. Finally, in Section 10, 
we make some concluding remarks. 
2. Formal description of the model
The environment consists of n agents and k goods or services to be allocated, 
which we call slots. Let N = {1, . . .  ,n} index the set of agents, and let J{ = {1, . . .  ,k} 
index the set of slots. It is assumed that both N and J{ are finite and nonempty. 
Let .A be the set of feasible (i.e., at most, one slot may be assigned to each agent), 
deterministic allocations of J{ to N, including the zero allocation where no agent 
receives a slot. 
Since agents either receive or do not receive a slot, an allocation in .A can be 
denoted by a feasible allocation matrix of zeros and ones. That is, a E .A is an n x k 
matrix consisting of at most a single 1 in each row and column, where an element 
a;1=1 if agent z is assigned slot J, and a;1 = 0, if he is not. We also define 
ai = (ail' . . .  , aik)·
We provide the following definition: 
DEFINITION 2.0. An allocation x E .A is weakly feasible (WF} if I: 1x;1 s 1 Vi E N, 
Z:;x;1Sl Vj EK, and L;Ljx;1smin(k,n). If n=k, this definition reduces to the
requirement that L;jx;1Sl, Vi EN, and L:;x;1Sl, Vj EK. 
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Efficiency and monotonicity of preferences will imply that either all slots are 
allocated or every agent is allocated a slot. The following definition is used: 
DEFINITION 2.1. An allocation x E .A is strictly feasible {SF} if L 1xi1 .'.:: 1 Vi EN,
2=
i
xi1:::;1 VjEK, and Li
2=1x;1=min(k,n). If n=k, this definition reduces to the
requirement that 2=1xi
j = 1, Vi EN, and L;Xij = 1 Vj EK.
The preferences of each agent depend upon the .slot allocated and the agent's 
type. An agent's type parameterizes the value he places on the goods being allocated. 
Let Eli C iJ?k be a set of possible types for agent z, Vi EN. Let EJN =c X Eli. A'EN 
B E E>N will be called a profile. The number of agents and slots is fixed, so the feasible
set is independent of the profile. Each agent i, of type (}i, evaluates each outcome x E .A 
through a valuation function U(x, (}i) = L 1xi;B�. The quantity U(x, Bi) represents the
willingness to pay of agent i of type (}i for outcome x. 
Agents may be indifferent between distinct outcomes since they are selfish; that 
is, they care only about the slots allocated to them. When lotteries are not allowed (the 
outcome space is .A), and agents are selfish, there is no loss of generality in the linear 
description of utility since there are a finite number of slots. That is, when agents are 
selfish and the outcome space is .A, then for any utility function U(x), there is a (}i such 
that U(x,Bi) = U(x). 
Although agents may be indifferent between outcomes, our results require that 
agents not be indifferent between slots. The following definition is used: 
DEFINITION 2.2. A preference domain (U, E>N) satisfies strict individual preferences
{SIP} if Vi EN, V(}i E EJi, U(m, Bi) of U(l, Oi) Vm of l EK; where U(j, Oi) =the utility 
to type Bi of slot j. That is, each agent has strict preferences over slots. Given the 
definition of U( ·), SIP holds if and only if Bi of o;,,, Vm, l EK, m of l, Vi EN. 
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For every possible profile, the planner wishes to choose a single allocation from 
the set of feasible allocations; in addition, the planner requires these assignments to 
satisfy some criteria. That is, she wishes to implement a social choice function9 {SCF), 
f: GN >->.A, that selects an outcome in .A for every profile in GN. Alternatively, we can
describe a social choice correspondence {SCC), f: GN >-> 'P( .A), which selects a nonempty
subset of .A for every profile in GN, where 'P(.A) denotes the power set of .A. A SCF is a
single-valued SCC. In theorem A.l in Appendix A, we show that in our environment 
we can restrict attention to SCFs. 
Given a SCF, the planner must then choose a procedure or device to obtain these 
allocations. For example, she may ask agents to place numerical values between 0 and 
1 on each slot and then make the assignment that maximizes the sum of the valuations. 
These procedures contain two parts, a message space and an outcome rule. The 
combination of message space and outcome rule 1s a game form, also called a 
mechanism. The planner chooses a mechanism to "implement" her choice of social 
choice rule. A SCF is implementable if there exists a game form (message space and 
outcome rule) such that the equilibria (under some appropriate solution concept) of this 
game corresponds to the outcomes of the social choice function. 
We make two assumptions, as described by Palfrey (1990), about the planner's 
ability to implement a social choice rule with a mechanism: 1) the commitment 
assumption: The planner may commit to any feasible outcome rule, and he is 
committed to his choice; 2) the control assumption: The planner may choose any 
message space and the agents must communicate exactly one message from this 
message space and may not communicate with each other. We remark that if two 
different mechanisms can fully implement a SCF, each agent and the planner are 
indifferent between them. 
There are a number of solution concepts that can be applied; in this paper we 
will be concerned with two solution concepts: dominant-strategy implementation and 
Nash implementation (Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979), and Maskin (1986) 
discuss these solution concepts in detail). The resulting mechanisms can be 
significantly different under the two solution concepts (e.g., the divide-the-cake 
problem). Another solution concept is Bayesian implementation (see the discussion in 
Palfrey (1990), which also includes references to other solution concepts). Bayesian 
9 The literature often interchanges and confuses the terms social choice function, voting scheme, and mech­
anism. In this paper the term social choice function is used to describe the type of outcome or allocation that the
planner may wish to obtain; a mechanism or voting scheme is a procedure or device to obtain allocations. 
mechanisms for the assignment problem are explored in Olson (1991). 
Dominant-strategy and Bayesian implementation are solution concepts that are 
consistent with the assumption of incomplete information, while Nash implementation 
requires complete information (for the agents but not the planner). Dominant-strategy 
implementation is more robust than Bayesian implementation since it is prior­
independent. Bayesian implementation requires the stronger condition that the infor­
mation structure is common knowledge, the designer knows the common prior, and 
Bayesian rationality among all players is common knowledge .. Dominant-strategy imple­
mentation tends to be more stable than Nash implementation since there are fewer 
equilibria, but there are fewer instances where dominant-strategy implementation is 
possible. All the solution concepts have multiplicity problems under certain conditions, 
but the problem is least difficult under dominant-strategy implementation (see 
Mookerhjee and Reichelstein (1989), and Ledyard (1986) ). 
More formally: let (g, S) denote a mechanism (or game form), where g: S>->.A, 
S = (S1, . .  ., Sn) and Si is the strategy space (or message space) for agent i EN. Let
E9: eN >--> S be an equilibrium correspondence. A dominant-strategy equilibrium for
profile () E 8N of a mechanism (g, S) is an n-tuple of strategies s = (s1 , . .  ., sn) ES such
that (Vi E N)(Vs ES) (U(g(si, s-i), Bi);::: U(g(s), ei)). Let DE9(()) c S be the dominant­
strategy equilibria for profile () of mechanism (g, S). A Nash equilibrium for profile 
() E 8N of a mechanism (g, S) is an n-tuple of strategies s = (:51, • .  ., :sn) ES such that
(Vi E N)(Vs' E Si) (U(g(s), B i );::: U(g(s' , s-i), Oi)). Let NE9(()) c S be the Nash equilibria 
for profile () of mechanism (g, S). 
There are a number of different notions of implementation. The strongest is full 
implementation, which is applied to general game forms. A weaker concept is truthful 
implementation, which is defined for direct mechanisms. A direct mechanism is a 
mechanism in which the strategy space S' for each agent i E N is the set of possible 
types e'. In direct mechanisms, agents report thei.r types (not necessarily their true 
types) to the planner, and then the planner makes an assignment based on these 
reported types. 
Implementation m dominant strategies and implementation m Nash strategies 
are now defined. 
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DEFINITION 2.3. A SCF f: GN>-+.A is implementable in Nash strategies if 
(VB E 0N)(Va E f(B))3 (g, S)[g(NE9(B)) C f(B) and a E g(NE9(B))]. 
DEFINITION 2.4. A SCF f: eN >--+.A is fully implementable in dominant strategies if 
there is a mechanism (g, S) such that (VB E 0N) [g(DE9(B)) = f(B)]. 
DEFINITION 2.5. A SCF f: GN >--+ .A is truthfully implementable in dominant
strategies if there is a direct mechanism g: GN >-+ .A such that (VB E 0N) 
[(Vi E N)(V'iJi E Eli)( U(g(B),B;) 2 U(g(Bi,B-i), B;) ) and g(B) E f(B)]. 
The simplest and most direct means of implementing a SCF is to ask agents to 
report their type, then calculate from this information the assignment using the SCF. 
This is a particular type of direct mechanism, where the outcome rule is the SCF to be 
implemented. This notion of implementation was used in the G-S theorem and the 
other results mentioned in the introduction. 
3. Strategic behavior
In this section we simplify the notion of implementation and use the concept of 
strategy-proof SCFs. A strategy-proof SCF truthfully implements itself in dominant 
strategies. In the next section I show that this is not a restriction in this environment if 
we are interested in full implementation. A SCF f: eN >--+.A is strategy-proof if 
(VB E eN)(Vi E N)(V'iJi E ei) [U(f(B), Bi) 2 U(f(Bi, B-i), Bi)]. 
A SCF f :GN >-+A is manip?Llable if for some i E N, (38  E E>N) (3Bi  E Eli) such that 
U(f(B\B-i), Bi) > U(f(B), Bi). In this case we say i manipulates f at B with ?Ji. If a SCF 
is strategy-proof, then an agent is not able to improve his allocation (be assigned a more 
preferred slot) by lying about his type to the planner. This restriction reduces the 
strategic options to the agent and hence the possible allocations. This form of strategic 
behavior has been studied quite extensively (Muller and Satterthwaite (1986) provide a 
good review). 
A second form of strategic behavior, which has received very little attention10, is 
the ability of an agent to change another agent's allocation without changing his own. 
Mechanisms with this property are labeled bossy, by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein 
lO I have found only two references in the literature to this concept, Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) 
and Ritz (1985). 
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(1981), and labeled corruptible by Ritz (1985). A rule is bossy (or corruptible) if an 
agent can maintain her allocation at the same time she causes changes in the allocations 
that other agents receive. Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein do not consider whether 
"nonbossiness is a reasonable or desirable condition to require of a mechanism." 
Although we also require a mechanism to be nonbossy, in our environment it is a 
reasonable requirement. 
In the context of this paper we refer to SCFs as being corruptible and to 
mechanisms as being bossy. We define these concepts formally:" 
DEFINITION 3.1. The SCF f: eN >->A 1s noncorruptible {NC) if (VB E EJN) 
( 'efi, j E N)('efBj E EJi)[Ji(B) = Ji(B-i,'/Ji) '* t(B) = t(B-iJJi)] . The SCF f:EJN f-+.A. IS 
corruptible if (JB E EJN)( Ji, j E N) (JBi E EJi)[Ji(B) = Ji(B-i, Bi) '* J'(B) # Ji(B-i, Bi)]. 
DEFINITION 3.2. The mechanism (g, S) g:S>->.A. is bossy if (Js E S) ( Ji, j E N
and a 3i E Si)[gi(s) = gi(s-i, si)=?gi(s-i, si) # gi(s-i,si)] . The mechanism (g, S) 
g: S >-->.A. is nonbossy if it is not bossy. An agent i E N is said to be bossy if she can 
change the outcome for some agent j E N. 
We combine the two notions of strategic behavior and say that a SCF is 
nonstrategic if it is both noncorruptible and strategy-proof. As an example to see the 
existence of noncorruptible, strategy-proof mechanisms, observe the following example: 
EXAMPLE 3.3. Let n = k = 3, and let EJi = {A, B,C,D,E, F} 'efi E N. Define the 
allocation rule: 
f1 (C, B2, B') = 1, f2(C, B2, B3) = 2, J3(C, B2, B3) = 3;
f1(D, B2, B') = 1, f2(D, B2, B') = 3, f3(D, B2, B3) = 2, vB2 B3 ' ,
where lO = j denotes that agent i receives slot j. Agent 1 is bossy, since by changing 
his type from C to D, he changes the allocation to agents 2 and 3 but not to himself. 
The mechanism is strategy-proof for agent 1 since he always receives slot 1 (we make 
the assumption that when an agent is indifferent between being truthful and 
misrepresenting his type, he will be truthful), and for agents 2 and 3, since they cannot 
affect the outcome of the mechanism. Observe that the conditions of noncorruptibility 
and strategy-proofness are true for whatever meaning we give to the types Bi as long as 
l l  The definitions of noncorruptible and nonbossy vary slightly from SS and Ritz but are consistent with their
usage in the matching environment. 
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the individuals are selfish. D. 
When a mechanism is strategy-proof and nonbossy, then an agent cannot 
improve his position directly by manipulating the outcome. But when a mechanism is 
strategy-proof and bossy, an agent may be able to improve his position indirectly by 
taking a "bribe" from the other agents. In the example above, agent 1 may be able to 
induce either agent 2 or 3 to pay him to choose in their favor.If a SCF is corruptible, 
the planner's problem of predicting outcomes becomes more difficult . . The planner must 
model (try to predict) the behavior of agents who may be able to bribe or coerce 
another agent. If a SCF is noncorruptible, then the task of predicting behavior, and 
hence the the outcome of a mechanism, is simpler. In the language of implementation 
theory, the addition of the noncorruptibility restriction reduces the possible equilibria of 
a mechanism. 
4- Implementation 
It is well known that if a SCF is implementable, then it is truthfully implemen­
table; that is, there exists a direct mechanism such that truth-telling is an equilibrium. 
The converse is not always true. However, in the Appendix, we show that in the one­
sided matching environment, if a SCF is truthfully implementable and noncorruptible, 
then it is fully implementable in dominant strategies. This equivalence allows us to 
restrict the planner's matching problem to direct mechanisms. We also show that full 
implementation is equivalent to strategy-proofness, when SCFs are noncorruptible, 
which allows us to restrict the problem even further to self-implementable SCFs. 
We formally state the theorem, which is proven in the Appendix. 
THEOREM 4.1. If preferences satisfy SIP, and if a SCF is noncorruptible, then 
strategy-proofness, truthful implementation, and full implementation in dominant 
strategies are all equivalent. 
Proof: See Appendix A. D. 
In this section we have shown that there is no loss of generality by focussing on 
SCFs rather than on SCCs and on strategy-proofness rather than on full implementation 
in dominant strategies. The ability to reduce the class of feasible mechanisms (or 
implementable SC Cs) represents a significant reduction in the complexity of the 
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problem. This reduction has been achieved by making two assumptions. The first 
assumption is a restriction on the domain of preferences; we assume that individuals 
have strict preferences over slots and that they are selfish. The second assumption is a 
restriction on the strategic behavior that is allowed; we enforce the requirement that 
SCFs are noncorruptible and strategy-proof. 
5. Dominant-strategy implementation (ordinality)
In this section we describe a necessary condition for implementation in dominant 
strategies. We first investigate a necessary condition in our environment for a SCF to 
be truthfully implementable in dominant strategies. From DHM we know that a SCF 
is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies if and only if it satisfies independent 
person-by-person monotonicity (IPM) (Maskin (1986), and DHM (1979)). First we 
provide some preliminary definitions. 
DEFINITION12 5.1. A SCF f: eN >-+ .A satisfies independent person-by-person
monotonicity (!PM} if VB E 0N, Vi E N, V B; E 0i, and V{a, b}� .A such that 
a E J(B), and U(a, Bi) > U(b, Bt it must be that b rt J(B-i , Bi). 
DEFINITION 5.2. A rank function is a function 
r:0; >-+ TI  { r1 , r2, . . .  ,rk}, such that r,(B;) > r1(B;) if and only if U(j, B;) > U( l , fi) ; where
U(j, B') =the utility to type B; of slot j,  and TI {A} is the set of all permutations of the 
set A. 
DEFINITION 5.3. A SCF is individually ordinal if VB E eN, Vi E N, V B; E 0;, such 
that r(B;) = r( B\ then J'(B) = J'(B-i , B'), where Ji is the allocation to agent i. A 
SCF IS ordinal if VB E eN, Vi E N, V B; E ei, such that r(Bi) = r( Bi) , then 
f(B) = f(B-i, B} 
A SCF is individually ordinal if an agent's assignment does not change when his 
ordinal preferences do not change. An SCF is ordinal if the group assignment does not 
change when an agent's ordinal preferences do not change. If a SCF is ordinal, then it 
is individually ordinal, but if a SCF is individually ordinal, it is not necessarily ordinal. 
For an individually ordinal SCF to be ordinal it must also be noncorruptible. To prove 
12 This is not the definition of IPM that appears in DHM (1979), but it is the definition given in Laffont and
Maskin (1982), and Mask.in (1986). 
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our result we show that if a SCF satisfies IPM, then it is individually ordinal. We state 
the theorem below and prove it in Appendix B. 
THEOREM 5.4. If preferences satisfy SIP, if A is the allocation space, and if a SCF 
can be truthfully implemented in dominant strategies, then the SCF 1s individually 
ordinal. In addition, if the SCF is noncorruptible then it is ordinal. 
Proof See Appendix B. D. 
We have shown that an ordinal condition is necessary for IPM when preferences 
satisfy SIP, and when the allocation space is A, but is it sufficient? The answer is no. 
We give an example of a SCF that is ordinal but cannot be truthfully implemented in 
dominant strategies. 
EXAMPLE 5.5. Let n = k = 3, and r:E>i>->IT{r1,r2,r3}, be the rank function, where
r1 = 1.0, r2 = 0.5, and r3 = 0. Let f(B) = argmaxI:;I:,r;(Bi) ·X;;; ties are resolved byx E .A. 
giving the lower indexed agent his preferred slot, and x is strictly feasible.13 Let 
U( x,Bi) = I: j X;;Bj ' and gi = (BL e;, B;) E iR3.
Since f depends on B only through the rank function r, f is ordinal. We will 
show that truth is not a dominant strategy for some (}. For our example we will define 
2 types: type A, B(A) = (1.0,0.5,0) and type B B(B) = (0,1.0,.5). 
Two allocations of the SCF f are f(A,A,B) = (1,3,2), and f(A,B,B) = (1,2,3), 
where f(i,j,k) is the allocation if agent 1 is type i , agent 2 is type j, and agent 3 is 
type k, J( · ) = (I, m, n) is the allocation of I to agent 1, m to agent 2, and n to
agent 3. 
When 0-2 = (1, 3), a report of type A, by agent 2, gives him slot 3. A report of 
type B gives agent 2 slot 2. So when agent 2 is a type A, he is better off reporting a 
type B, which gives him his 2nd ranked slot 2, instead of his 3rd ranked slot 3. D. 
In summary, we have proven that if a SCF is truthfully implementable in 
dominant strategies, then it is individually ordinal, and if in addition, it is noncorrupt­
ible, then it is ordinal. 
13 This is a an example of a positional mechanism. 
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6. Serial dictator
In the previous sections we showed that if a SCF is implementable in dominant 
strategies then it is ordinal and that there is no loss of generality in requiring strategy­
proofness. Hence, we will restrict ourselves to finding strategy-proof ordinal mech-
an1sms. 
Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) established a Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type 
theorem in a classical economic environment (alternatives are a compact and convex 
subset of �1). Their result relies on a differentiable allocation mechanism and a number 
of other technical conditions. The environment constructed for the assignment problem 
(without lotteries) lacks convexity, and we do not require a mechanism to be 
differentiable. Hence, the results of this paper do not fall into the class of environments 
established by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, although we obtain a similar result. 
Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981, p. 588) describe a serial dictatorship14 as
follows: 
Serial dictatorship means that the mechanism consists of one or more 
hierarchies of agents where the highest ranking agent in each hierarchy 
selects his allocation from a feasible set that is exogenously given, the second 
highest ranking agent selects his allocation from a feasible set that depends 
on the first agent's choice, the third highest ranking agent selects his alloca­
tion from a feasible set that depends on the first and second agents' choices, 
etc. Consequently, an agent who is high on a hierarchy is a dictator to 
those agents lower on that hierarchy in the sense that he can affect what is 
available to them to choose among and they can not affect him reciprocally. 
He is not, however, necessarily a dictator in the stronger senses of being able 
to choose any technologically feasible outcome for himself and being able to 
impose particular outcomes on the other agents. 
The serial dictator is a member of the class of sequential-choice mechanisms. A 
sequential choice mechanism is a mechanism where there is an ordering (or hierarchy) 
of agents, which may depend on the profile. Given this ordering, each agent in turn is 
allowed to choose their slot from an option set, which is a nonempty set of slots 
presented to them. These option sets have the feature that each agent's decision affects 
only the option sets of those agents that are lower on the hierarchy. Associated with 
each sequential-choice mechanism is an ordering I(fJ) = {i1 , . . .  , in} E IP'(N), which may
vary with fJ, and where IP'(N) is the set of permutations of agents. In the serial 
mechanism the option set to agent i1 is K, the option set to i2 is a subset of K, and so
14 An early reference to a serial dictatorship is found in Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 344), who observe that a
serial dictatorship "is consistent with all of Arrow's conditions except nondictatorship." 
on. That is, each agent has her turn to choose slots from a set of slots, whose elements 
are affected by those agents who are placed before her in the ordering. 
The following definitions are used formally to define a sequential-choice 
mechanism and the serial dictator:i5 
DEFINITION 6.1. For a given direct mechanism x: eN >-t .A, agent i affects agent j 
at B E  0N if ( :J7Ji E 0') :J xj(B) =J xj(7Ji, B-i) . We write this as iA(B)j. 
DEFINITION 6.2. For a given direct mechanism x: 0N >-t .A, A( B) is acyclic at B E eN 
if V(ii , i2, . . .  , in ) E IP'( N) ii A( B)i2, i2A( B)i,, . . .  , in-i A( B)in =}ii A( B)in. I( B) = {ii ,  . . .  , in} is
the ordering that is induced by the acyclic mechanism. 
DEFINITION 6.3. A direct mechanism x: eN >-t .A is a sequential choice mechanism
if VB E 0N, A(B) is acyclic. 
DEFINITION 6.4. o(i, B) = {a E .A I :JB' :i a =  J(B-',B') } ;  O(i, B) ={ I E  I< I :JB' :i l = 
J '(B-• , 7Ji ) } .  
Given B-i E eN-', o(i, B) is the set of agent i's options at profile B that she can 
receive by deviating her messages, and O(i, B) is the set of slots that agent i can receive 
at profile B by deviation her messages. Note: Both 0( i, B) and o( i, B) do not depend on 
B' and clearly (VB E 0N)[f(B) E o(i, B) J and O(i, B) = o'(i, B) . 
DEFINITION 6.5. A direct mechanism x: 0N >-t .A is a serial dictator if VB E eN, 
A(B) is acyclic and O(imB) c O(in-i , B) c O(in-2, B) c ... c O(ii , B) = I<.
This definition of a serial dictator is broader than the description in the 
introduction. That description describes a simple serial dictator wherein an ordering 
I = {ii , i2, . . .  , in} of agents is fixed and does not depend on the profile. Given this fixed
ordering, agents choose their slots in ·turn: ii goes first, then i2 chooses her slot from
those remaining, and so on. The definition provided here (and also in SS) allows the 
ordering of agents to vary with B E 0N. The main theorem and an important lemma 
are stated below: 
15 These definitions follow Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981). 
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THEOREM 6.6. If preferences satisfy SIP, f: eN 1-t .A IS strategy-proof and 
noncorruptible; then for all (} E eN, A( B) is acyclic. 
Proof See Appendix C. D.
LEMMA 6.6d (Asymmetry). If preferences satisfy SIP and f: eN 1-t .A IS strategy­
proof and noncorruptible; then (VB E E>N)(Vi, j E N) iA(B)j =?either: 
1) o(i, B) = o(j, B), or 2) �jA(B)i.
Proof See Appendix C. D. 
In the previous lemma we showed that an agent i affects another agent j then 
agent j cannot affect agent i except in one instance. In that instance agent i and agent 
j both have the same option set and can affect each others outcome. This case 
describes the nature of the ordering that is induced by a sequential choice mechanism. 
When both agents can affect each other at a profile the relative ordering of agent i and 
j does not affect the nonstrategic outcome at that profile. 
7. Nash Implementation
We now investigate to see whether the use of Nash equilibria can expand the 
class of implementable SCFs. We do this by applying the result by DHM which states 
that if the environment is rich, then a SCF implementable in Nash strategies 1s 
truthfully implementable in dominant strategies. We show that our domain of 
preferences is rich 16 when the allocation space is .A.
DEFINITION 7.L A class (U, e•) of utility functions is rich if\;/ pairs {B', a•} c e•, and 
\;/ {a, b} C .A, such that 
i) U(a, B;) 2: U(b, B;) =? U(a,B;) 2: U(b,B;), and ii) U(a, B;) > U(b,B;) =? U(a, .9•) > U(b,B;);
there exists a 7Ji E E>i, such that \;/ c E .A,
a) U(a, B;) 2: U(c, B•) =? U(a,7Ji) 2: U(c,7Ji), and b) U(b,B;) 2: U(c,B;) =? U(b,7J•) 2: U(c,7Ji).
PROPOSITION 7.2. If preferences satisfy SIP then the domain of preferences is rich. 
Proof See Appendix D. D. 
16 Rich is also known as monotonically closed. DHM (1979) and Laffont and Maskin (1982) provide 
discussions of this concept. 
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When our domain of preferences is rich, we can apply the following result from 
DHM (theorem 7.2.3). If the domain of preferences (U, 0;) is rich Vi E N, then if a 
SCF is implementable in Nash equilibrium, it is truthfully implementable in dominant 
strategies. This result follows since for rich domains and single-valued choice functions, 
monotonicity implies independent, weak monotonicity (IWM), which implies 
independent person-by-person monotonicity (IPM). If we also add the requirement that 
the SCF is noncorruptible, then it is fully implementable in dominant strategies. In 
addition, by applying DHM (theorem 7.1.1), if a SCF is truthfully implemented in 
dominant strategies, then it is truthfully implemented in Nash strategies. It is not 
necessarily true that a SCF that is fully implemented in dominant strategies is fully 
implemented in Nash strategies. 
Therefore, the Nash solution concept does not allow us to implement more SCFs 
than the dominant-strategy solution concept. Furthermore, even if we use the Nash 
solution concept, we can fully implement only those SCFs that are ordinal. This does 
not imply that if we use a cardinal SCF, there are no Nash strategies, but that there are 
additional equilibria that do not result in the implementation of the SCF. 
8. Optimality of Implementable Rules
In this section we discuss the optimality properties of implementable rules. A 
minimal requirement for optimality of a SCF is Pareto optimally (PO). If an allocation 
is not PO, then either there is an agent who can be made strictly better off by taking 
the surplus, or there are at least two agents who can be made strictly better off by 
trading. 
DEFINITION 8.1. A SCF / :  eN >-> .A  1s Strong Pareto Optimal (SPO) if VB E fJN, 
and all a E J(B), there does not exist a b E .A, such that Vi E N, U(b,11;) ::'.'. U(a,11;) 
and for some j E N, U(b,111) > U(a,11j). 
In general, sequential-choice mechanisms are not Pareto optimal. However, the 
serial dictator can be readily seen to be strong Pareto optimal, since every agent is 
matched with her most preferred slot in the available set. It is readily seen that if a 
SCF is SPO then it must be strictly feasible. This allows us to restrict attention to the 
set of strictly feasible (SF) allocations if we want to restrict ourselves to PO allocations. 
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A strictly feasible allocation may not be PO, but if it is not strictly feasible, then it is 
not PO. 
In previous sections we restricted agents' preferences over slots to be strict. This 
1s different from the restriction of strict preferences used in DHM and in much of the 
dominant-strategy literature. In most implementation papers preferences are strict over 
outcomes. In our case, agents are selfish and are indifferent between allocations that 
give them the same slot but give other agents different slots. Because of this 
indifference, many of the results of DHM and others are not .applicable. 
DHM show that when the preference domain is rich and consists of strict 
preferences, if a SCF satisfies citizen sovereignty (CS) and IPM, then the SCF is weak 
Pareto optimal and we obtain similar results, but for our environment we also require 
that the SCF be noncorruptible. We include a definition of CS and state the 
proposition which is proven in Appendix E. 
DEFINITION 8.2. A SCF f:8N >->.A satisfies citizen sovereignty (CS) if Va E .A*, 
311 E eN, such that a E f(B), where .A*= {a E .A I a is strictly feasible}. That is, the 
mapping f is onto the set of strictly feasible allocations. 
PROPOSITION 8.3. If preferences satisfy SIP, then if a SCF is noncorruptible, satisfies 
IPM, and CS, it is strong Pareto optimal (SP0).17 
Proof See Appendix E. D.
The following is an example wherein a mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness 
and noncorruptibility but not CS. 
EXAMPLE 8.4. Let N = {1,2,3}, K = {1,2,3}. Let f be the S CF that 1s 
implemented by the following mechanism: 
Let 01( · ) = {2, 3} : the option set available to agent 1. 
Let 02( · ) = {2, 3} : the option set available to agent 2. 
Let 03( · ) = {1} : the option set available to agent 3. 
and I(B) = {1,2,3} VB, the order that agents choose slots. 
17 If we remove the requirement that preferences satisfy SIP then the SCF is weak Pareto optimal; where a 
SCC f: 0N 1--l' .A is Weak Pareto Optimal {WPO} if VOE eN, and all a E f(O), there does not exist a b E ..A, such 
that Yi EN, U(b,Oi) > U(a,Oi).
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That is, agent 1 selects first from the set {2, 3}, agent 2 selects second from the 
remainder of set {2, 3}, and agent 3 receives slot 1. This mechanism satisfies SP, since I 
doesn't depend on B, and is noncorruptible (it is also nonconstant ), but it does not 
satisfy CS. 
Let B1 = 1>2>3, 82 = 1>2>3, and 83 = 3>2>1; then a= f(B). But if b = (1, 2,3),
then U(b,B;) > U(a,B;) Vi. So f is not Pareto optimal (strong or weak). 0. 
The results of this section indicate that if a SCF is strategy-proof and 
noncorruptible and satisfies citizen sovereignty, then it is Pareto optimal. 
9. Application of results to mechanisms
Given the results in the previous sections, what can we say about the types of 
mechanisms that can be implemented? In the introduction we described three 
categories of mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature to "solve" the one­
sided matching problem. These were positional, chit, and choice mechanisms. In the 
previous sections we have proven some results that allow us to draw some conclusions 
about the ability to predict behavior in these mechanisms. 
We can readily apply the results of the previous sections to determine the 
implementability in dominant and Nash-strategy equilibrium of chit and choice 
mechanisms. Since the outcome of chit .mechanisms, as described in the introduction, 
can be affected by changing cardinal information, we cannot make dominant-strategy­
equilibrium predictions, or Nash-strategy-equilibrium predictions. Since a necessary 
condition for implementation in dominant strategies is that the outcome can only be 
affected by a change in ordinal information, chit mechanisms are not dominant strategy 
mechanisms. Choice mechanisms have been shown to be implementable in dominant 
strategies and if the mechanism is a serial dictator, it is also Pareto optimal. We now 
discuss the last class of mechanisms-positional mechanisms. 
We begin by formally describing a positional mechanism: a mechanism x: S >-+ .A
1s positional if there are strictly monotonic weighting functions w;: S; >-+ { w1, ... , wn}, 
w; E iR, Vi E N, and x( s) maximizes the function I: ;;X;;w;( i), where ties are broken
arbitrarily. If a SCF is implemented by positional mechanism, the SCF can be easily 
seen to be symmetric, and Pareto optimal, but it cannot be implemented in dominant 
strategies as the following proposition shows. 
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PROPOSITION 9.1. If a SCF can be implemented by a positional mechanism, then it 
is not implementable in dominant strategies. 
Proof. Without loss of generality let N = K. Suppose that the SCF f: GN >-+.A is 
implementable and let (} E GN, such that (Ji = (JJ, \:/i, j E N, and e; > (}� > · ·  · > (}�; (} is
an allowable profile in the matching environment. Since f is positional, any strictly 
feasible allocation a E .A will maximize x( a, fJ) = I:; i, jaijw( fJ�), as long as w( · ) is
strictly monotonic. Without loss of generality let a =  f(fJ) = {1, . . .  , n}; that is, agent i is 
assigned slot i, ai = i. So U( a, (}1) = fJj, U( a, fJ2) = (}�, and so on. 
Let fp be such that .9� > Bf, \fl f 2. Then x(a, (B3,fJ"3)) is maximized by a3 = 2,
and a2 = 3; this implies that 2A( fJ)3. 
Let 02 be such that 05 > Of, \fl f 3. Then x(a, (02, e·2)) is maximized by a2 = 2, 
and a3 = 3;  this implies that 3A( fJ)2. 
But since f is implementable, there is an affects relation A( fJ) induced by f, and 
the asymmetry property of the affects relation A( fJ) implies that 2A( fJ)3 and � 3A( 0)2, 
so f cannot be implementable. 
D. 
The only class of procedures with a dominant strategy prediction is the class of 
choice mechanisms. An example of one of these mechanisms is the serial dictator, 
which is Pareto optimal but not symmetric, unless there is a random selection of order. 
10. Conclusion
There have been a number of procedures proposed in the literature to "solve" the 
one-sided matching problem. Almost all of these procedures assume an agent's behavior 
is nonstrategic. If we assume that an agent's behavior reflects his own best interest, 
strategic behavior is likely. The importance of understanding an agent's strategic 
behavior reflects the importance of the planner's ability to determine the outcome of an 
allocation mechanism. The more that can be said about an agent's strategic behavior, 
the more precise can be the planner's prediction of the outcome of an allocation 
mechanism. 
Determining an agent's strategic behavior can be quite complex, but in the one­
sided matching problem there does exist a class of SCCs whose outcomes are easily 
predicted. This is the class of noncorruptible and strategy-proof SCFs. In this paper 
we were able to show that the class of strategy-proof and noncorruptible SCFs does not 
exclude any secs that can be implemented in dominant strategies. But most 
importantly, we were able to characterize the class of implementable SCFs, that is, 
those SCFs that are strategy-proof and noncorruptible. We found that SCFs must rely 
only on ordinal information to be implementable and the Nash solution concept does 
not enlarge the class of implementable SCFs. We also found that the only 
implementable SCFs were sequential choice mechanisms, and that a particular member 
of this class, the serial dictator, was also Pareto optimal. 
11. Appendix A
In appendix A, we show that in our environment we can restrict attention to 
SCFs and that we can restrict attention to strategy-proofness. We show in theorem A . l  
that in the one-sided matching environment, which we describe, a nonstrategic sec is 
single-valued and hence there is no loss in restricting the matching problem to SCFs. 
THEOREM A.l. If preferences satisfy SIP, then if a SCC is noncorruptible and fully 
implementable in dominant strategies, it is single-valued. 
Proof. Suppose f: 8N f--+ .A is not single-valued; then for B E  8N, let a, b E f(B), a oj b. 
Let (g, S) fully implement f in dominant strategies, 3 3, s  E S(B), such that g(s) = b, 
and g( s) = a. 31 and s1 are both dominant strategies for B1 , so
U(g(s1 , s-1 ) , B1) = U(g(s' ,s-1), B') . SIP implies that g1(s',s-1 ) = g1(s1, s-1) = a1; non-
corruptibility implies that l(.S',s-1) = i(s1, s-1) = ai, Vi E N; hence 
g(s', s-1 ) = g(s',s-1) = a. Similarly, g(s', 52, s-1' 2) = g(s', s-1) = a. Continuing iter-
atively, g(s) = a, which is a contradiction, so f is single-valued. D.
We prove the equivalence of strategy-proofness, truthful implementation, and 
full implementation, by first proving three lemmas and then combining them into the 
theorem. 
LEMMA A.2. If preferences satisfy SIP, then if a SCF is noncorruptible and truthfully 
implementable in dominant strategies, it is fully implementable in dominant strategies. 
Proof. Let /: eN f-+ .A be truthfully implemented in dominant strategies by g': eN f-+ .A.
Define f*: 8N >->.A so that VB E 8N, J*(B) = g*(E .(B)), where E .(B) is the set ofg g 
dominant-strategy equilibria for preference profile B in game form g*. Now by 
construction, g* fully implements f*. Therefore, J*(B) must be a singleton VB E 8N. 
But g*(B) E f(B); therefore, J*(B) i;;: f(B), VB E 8N. Since f is single-valued,
J*(B) = f(B), VB E 8N, so g* fully implements f. D.
We apply two well-known results. 1) If a SCF is strategy-proof, then it truth­
fully implements itself in dominant strategies. 2) If a SCF is fully implementable in 
dominant strategies, then it is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies. 
LEMMA A.3. If preferences satisfy SIP, and if a SCF is noncorruptible and strategy­
proof then, it is fully implementable in dominant strategies. 
Proof. Let f: GN >-+ .A  be strategy-proof and noncorruptible. Since f is strategy-proof, it
truthfully implements itself in dominant strategies. Since f is also noncorruptible, then 
by the previous lemma it is fully implementable in dominant strategies. D. 
LEMMA AA. If preferences satisfy SIP, and if a SCF is truthfully implementable in 
dominant strategies and noncorruptible, then it is strategy-proof. 
Proof. Let f: GN >-+ .A  be truthfully implementable in dominant strategies and
noncorruptible. Since f is truthfully implementable, 3 g: eN ...... .A such that VB E eN, 
Vi E N, Vii E 8', U(g(O),B') > U(g(B', o-'), B'), g(O) E f(O). Since f is truthfully 
implementable and noncorruptible, it is fully implementable and hence it is single­
valued, so g(O) = f(B), VO E GN. Therefore, U(f(B), B') 2: U(f(B', B-i),B'), so f is strategy­
proof. D. 
THEOREM 4_1. If preferences satisfy SIP, and if a SCF is noncorruptible, then 
strategy-proofness, truthful implementation, and full implementation in dominant 
strategies are all equivalent. 
Proof: Apply previous propositions. D. 
12- Appendix B 
Our first result relies on the following lemma. 
LEMMA B.l. If preferences satisfy SIP, and if a SCF f: eN >-+ .A satisfies IPM,
a E f(B), c E f(7J', B-'), and a' f c', then U(a,7J') < U(c,7Ji) and U(c, B') < U(a, Oi) . 
(remark: if a' = c', then equality holds). 
Proof Suppose our hypothesis holds; then 
1) If a E f(B) and U(a,li') > U(c,7J'), then IPM implies c rt f(7J', O-') .
2) If c E f(7J', o-') and U( c, B') > U( a, B') , then IPM implies a rt f( ()', o-').
Both 1) and 2) contradict the hypothesis". This implies: 
U(a,7J') � U(c,7J') and U(c,B') � U(a,B'). (B.l)
But by individual strict preferences and c' f a', it must be that U(a,7J') < U(c,7Ji) and 
U(c,B') < U(a,B'). D. 
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In the previous lemma if preferences do not satisfy SIP then U( a,7Ji) :::; U( c, (ji) 
and U( c, B') :::; U( a, Bi). 
The next two propositions establish that an ordinal condition 1s necessary for 
implementation in dominant strategies when the allocation space is .A. 
PROPOSITION B.2. If preferences satisfy SIP, .A is the allocation space, and if a 
SCF satisfies IPM, then it is individually ordinal. 
Proof Let f: GN >--+ .A be a SCF. Suppose that the hypothesis holds but that f is not 
individually ordinal. Then for some i E N, Bi,(ji E 8', where r(Bi) = r(Bi), there exists
a, b E .A such that a E J(B), and b E f(B', g-i) .  If ai fo b', then by lemma B.l, 
U( a, (ji) < U(b, (ji) and U(b, Bi) < U( a, Bi). But this is a contradiction since Bi, (ji have the
same ordinal preferences over slots and a, b allocate a single slot to agent i. It must be 
that either a is preferred to b for both Bi, Bi, or b is preferred to a for both e;, e'. D.
THEOREM 5.4. If preferences satisfy SIP, if .A is the allocation space, and if a SCF 
can be truthfully implemented in dominant strategies, then the SCF is individually 
ordinal. In addition, if the SCF is noncorruptible then it is ordinal. 
Proof By DHM (theorem. 4.3.1), a SCF can be truthfully implemented in dominant 
strategies if and only if it is IPM. By applying the previous proposition, the first result 
follows. For the second result, since the SCF is noncorruptible and individually ordinal, 
it is ordinal. D. 
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13. Appendi,x C
We provide some further definitions:I8 
DEFINITION 13.1. For Bi E Eli, x E .A, a {Ji E Eli Is a reshuffling of Bi around x if 
(Vy E .A)[U(x, Bi) 2: U(y,B}�;? U(x,!Ji) 2 U(y, !Ji)]. r(B',x) denotes the set of all reshuf­
flings of Bi around x, and a !Ji E r(Bi, x) is a reshuffle of Bi around x. 
A reshuffling of B' around x is another preference ordering such that x preserves 
the same ordinal rankings relative to all other alternatives. Observe: if SIP holds, 
x, y E .A, and {Ji E r(Bi, x); then [U(y, B') = U(x, Bi) <:=> U(y, !Ji) = U(x,!Ji)J. Some special 
preference relations will be used. Let xBi be the preferences obtained from B' when x is 
ranked first, all other ordinal preferences remaining the same; and let xB' be the 
preferences obtained from Bi when x is ranked last, all other ordinal preferences 
remaining the same. Let xei be the set of preferences that rank x first. 
For a direct mechanism f: eN >-+ .A,  define .Af = range of f. If y � .A, then yi is 
the set of slots Y' � [( that are obtained by i in Y. 
DEFINITION 13.2. For Y � .A, B' E El', let 
C( B', Y) = {a E Y I  U( a, B') 2 U(b, B')Vb E Y}
be the choice of agent B' in the set y of allocations, and let 
C'( B', Y) = {a' E Y' I U( a, B') 2: U(b, B')Vb E Y}
be the set of the best slots obtained by i in the set of allocations Y. If SIP holds, then 
Ci( B', Y) is a singleton. 
The main theorem is stated below: 
THEOREM 6.6. If preferences satisfy 
noncorruptible; then for all B E E>N, A( B) 
SIP, f:E>N >-+ .A  IS strategy-proof and 
is acyclic. 
The result of Theorem 1. is that for each B E  E>N, A(B) is acyclic; this permits 
the hierarchies of serial dictators to vary as B E  E>N. This is a similar result to SS. 
Before I prove the theorem I prove some lemmas that will be used in the proof. 
18 A number of concepts from Barbera (1983) are used; Barbera proved the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 
by a pivotal-voter technique. A similar technique is used in this paper. A mechanism is pivotal at () if 
3,9i 3 x(O-i, (;i) ::/- x(O). Clearly, if i affects j at e, then i is pivotal at e.
LEMMA C.0. For f: eN >-+ .A., if f is noncorruptible and (VO E 8N)(Vi E N) 
(ve• E e')[f(O) f f(e-',e') '* J'(e) f J'(e-', e')J. 
Proof. Suppose f: 8N >-+ .A.  satisfies the hypothesis of the lemma. Then f(O) f f(O-i,'iJi) 
implies either a) Ji(()) f f'(e-•, ei) or b) f;(O) f f;(e-•, e') or both. If a) is true then the
conclusion is true. If b) is true then noncorruptibility implies J'( 0) f J'( 9-i)Ji) and the 
conclusion is true. D. 
LEMMA 6.6a. If preferences satisfy SIP and /: eN >-+ .A.  is strategy-proof and 
noncorruptible, then (VB E 8N)(Vi E N)[f(O) = C(o(i, O), O')]. 
Proof. Suppose not. Let z = f(O) and x E C(o(i, O),B'), x f z. By definition of o( · ), 
3 0' 3 f(B;,()-;) = x and z = f(O) E o(i,O), so J(ii, fr') f f(O). Since f is noncorruptible, 
by lemma 0, it must be that x' f z'. Since x, z E o(i, O) and x E C(o(i, O), O'), 
SIP =;. U(x, O') > U(z, O') =;. U(f(O-•, e•), B;) > U(f(B),O'). Hence f is manipulable at () by i, 
a contradiction. D. 
The above lemma says that for every profile, the outcome must be the best 
option at that profile for each one of the agents. Without the noncorruptible condition 
the result of the lemma is f( B) E C( o( i, 0), O'), and if in addition SIP holds, then 
J;( 0) = C'( o( i, 0), O'). 
LEMMA 6.6b. If preferences satisfy SIP, f: eN >-+ .A.  1s strategy-proof and
noncorruptible, then (VO E 8N)(Vi E N)[B; E r(B',J(B)) =;. J(O-', B;) = f(B)]. 
Proof. Suppose not. Then for some () E eN, i E N, B' E r(B', J(O)), f(e-•, iJ•) f J(B). 
Since J is noncorruptible, by lemma 0., it must be that J'(e-•, ?Ji) f Ji(O). By SIP, 
either 
a) U(f ( 9-i, iJi), Bi) > U(f ( 0) , ()i), or
b) U(f(O), B;) > U(f(O-', B'), e•).
By definition of r() 'iJi E r(O', J(O)) =? [U(f(O),B') > U(y,O') -¢? U(f(O) ,iJ') > U(y, B'), 
Vy E .A., y' f J'(O)]. 
If a) is true, then a*) U(f(B-i, lJi),Bi) > U(f(B),B'). 
If b) is true, then b*) U(f(O) , e•) > U(f(O-' ,B•) , B;) . 
But a) and b*) contradict strategy-proofness, hence f(e-•, B') = J(O). D.
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The above lemma states that no agent can change the outcome at a profile by 
changing his preferences to a reshuffle around this outcome. If f is corruptible then 
the conclusion of the above lemma is Ji(fri)i) = t(O). 
LEMMA 6.6c. If preferences satisfy SIP, f: GN >-t .A. 1s strategy-proof and 
noncorruptible; then (\7' E 0N)(\7'i, j E N)(Oi E r( 0\ f( 0)) =? o(j, 0) = o(j, ( o-))i) )] . 
Proof. Let iJ = (tr i, 'iJi). We will show that o(j,B) c:;; o(j,O). We can show that
o(j, 0) c:;; o(j, B) by a similar argument, since f(O) = J(B) by lemma (lb), and 
IJi E r(Bi,J(B)) by the definition of r( · ). 
Suppose o(j,B) )?'. o(j, IJ) and let y E o(j,B), y r/:. o(j, 0), and let x = J(O). 
By lemma (lb), f(IJ) = f(B) = x. 
x = f(IJ) E o(j, IJ) by definition of o( · ), so x f' y. 
By lemma (la), f(IJ) = C(o(j, O), Oj), and xj = fj(IJ) = Cj(o(j, O), Oj). 
Let Yl}j denote the preferences obtained from Oj by lifting y to first place, all other 
rankings remaining the same. Since y r/:.  o(j,IJ), xj = fj(O) = Cj(o(j, IJ), YIJJ). 
By lemma (la), fj(O-j,yOj) = Cj(o(j, IJ-j, "IJj),"IJj). 
Also Cj(o(j, IJ), "Oj) = Cj(o(j, o-;, "0;), YIJ;), since o(j, · ) does not depend on IJj. So 
f;(IJ) = f;(o-;, "IJ;) = x. But y E o(j,B) =? y = f(B, "IJj) = C(o(j, B), "IJ;) by lemma (la), 
and y is best for "IJj. Expanding the arguments of J( - ) =? y  = f(O·ij, "Oj, Bi) and 
x = J( o-ij, YO;, Oi). Since Bi and IJi maintain the same relative ordinal preference between 
x and y, i can either manipulate (0-ij,yl}j,Bi) or (IJ·ij ,yOj,Ot which is a contradiction to 
the strategy-proofness of f. D. 
This lemma states that an agent cannot change the option set of any other agent 
by a reshuffling of his preferences. 
Example with simple serial dictator: 
Let n = k = 5 and the agent ordering is {l, 2, 3, 4, 5} for each profile. Let the 
profile be such that .the best slot for agent 1 is slot 1, the best slot for agent 2 is slot 2, 
and the ordinal preferences for agent 3 are (1, 2, 3, 4, 5). The ordering assigns slot 1 to 
agent 1, slot 2 to agent 2, and slot 3 to agent 3; the option set for agent 4 is {4, 5}. 
Suppose agent 3's preferences are reshuffled around the outcome (2, 1, 3, 5 ,4), then every 
agent's assignment remains the same. Let agent 3's preferences be changed to 
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(2, 4, 3, 1, 5 ), which is not a reshuffle around the outcome, then agent 3 is assigned slot 4
and the option set for agent 4 is {3, 5}. 
In the following lemmas if E 1s a relation, then � E denotes not E; the 
cardinality of set A, is denoted by I A I .
LEMMA 6.6d (Asymmetry). If preferences satisfy SIP and f: GN >-+ .A.  is strategy­
proof and noncorruptible then (VB E GN)(Vi, j E N) iA(B)j =? either:
1) o(i, B) = o(j, B) , or 2)
� 
jA(B)i. 
Proof. Suppose the hypothesis of the lemma holds, then iA( B)j requires that
3 B' 3 Ji(B-i, iJi) # Ji(B). Suppose that jA(B)i then :J iJi 3 J'(B-i, iJi) # J'(B). Let
y = f(B-',B'), z = f(B-i, iJi) and x = f(B). We will look at 2 mutually exclusive and
exhaustive cases. 
Case 1: V iJ•, iJi 3 Ji(B-i, iJi) # Ji(B) and J'(B-i,Bi) # f;(B), J(B-i, iJ') = J(B-i,iJi). 
The definition of o( · ) implies that { x, y} = o( i, B) and { x, z} = o(j, B). But x = z, 
so {x, y} = o(i, B) and {x, y} = o(j, B). Therefore o(i, B) = o(j,B) and I o(j, B) I = 2. 
The construction of y, z, and x implies that y # z, yi # xi and z' # x'. By
lemma (la), x, y E o(i, B) and x, z E o(j,B). z' # x' =? z  � f(B) and if U(z, B') > U(x,B') then
z � o( i, B-'). 
Let ii = zBi if U(x, Bi) > U(z,Bi) : put z last
ii = zBi if U(z,B') > U(x,B') : put z first
Let {p = "Bi if U(x, Bi) > U(y,Bi) : put y last
{Ji = YBi if U(y, Bi) > U(x,Bi) : put y first
For k # i, j, {Jk = Bk, so B = ( B-ii, B)J1). 
B' and {Ji are reshuffles of B' and Bi about x. 
Let ii' = "B' if U(x,B') > U(z,B') : put y first, z last
ii' = z("B') if U(z,B') > U(x,B') : put z first, y second
Let iii = z{Ji if U(x,Bi) > U(y,Bi) : z first, y last
iii = "(zBi) if U(y, Bi) > U(x, Bi) : y first ,  z second
Note that SIP and yi f xi, z' f x' eliminate the equality in the above definitions.
We now show that y = C(o(i, O), ii') and y = f(o-•, e•). 
Since f1i is a reshuffle of Bi around x = J(B), then by lemma (le), o(i, O) = o(i, B) 
and y E o( i, 0). By construction iji ranks y first or second. If iji ranks y first then
y = C(o(i, O), O'). If iji ranks y second, (1i ranks z first, but z � o(i,O), so z � o(i,O); and
hence, y = C(o(i, O), Oi). By lemma (la) , y = f(O-i, i}i). 
By a similar argument, we can show z = C( o(j, 0), Oi), and z = J( 8-i, Oi). 
By construction, iji E r(y,Oi), and o• E r(z,O'), so by lemma (lb) ,  y = f(e-•i/ Ji,e•), 
and z = f(e-•i, i}i, i}i), which is a contradiction since y f z and f is single-valued. D.
LEMMA 6.6e (Transitivity) . If preferences satisfy SIP, f: eN >-+ .A  is strategy-proof
and noncorruptible; then (VO E 8N)('efi, j E N)[iA(B)j & jA(B)k=;.. � kA(B)i]. 
Proof Suppose 3 i, j , k  E N  3 iA(B)j, jA(B)k , and kA(B)i. Without loss of generality let
i = 1, j = 2, and k = 3. IA(B)2 =;.. 3 (J1 3  j2(B-1, B1) f f2(B), 
2A(B)3 =;.. 3 02 3 j3(e-2, 02) i f3(B), and 3A(B)l =;.. 3 03 3 j1(e-3, 03) i j1(B).
Let y = f(e-1, IP) ,  z = f(e-2, 82), w = f(B-3, 03), and x = f(B); then y2 i x2, 
z3 i x3, and w1 i x1 • Noncorruptibility implies y1 f x1, z2 f x2, w3 f x3. Asymmetry
implies y3 i x3, z1 i x1, and w2 f x2• 
By definition of o(i, · ) x, y E o(l, B), x, z E (2, B), and w, z E o(3, B). 
z f x =? z  � f(B), y i x =? y  � f(B), w =/. x =? w � J(B). 
Define x' YB1 to by the preferences defined by x(Y01) if U(x, B1) > U(y, 81) ,  and by
Y(XB1) if U(y,(J1) > U(x, B1). Define x, yB1 to by the preferences defined by x(yB1) if
U(x, B1) > U(y, B1) and by y(x01) if U(y, B1) > U(x,B1). 
Let 01 = w, ,B1 if U(x,B1) > U(w, 01) : put (w: z) last
01 = z(w01) if U(w,01) > U(x, 01) : put w first, z last
Let 02 = y,wlJ2 if U(x, 02) > U(y,02) : put (y: w) last
02 = w("02) if U(y,B2) > U(x,02) : put y first, w last
Let 03 = " "03 if U(x, 03) > U(z, 03) : put (z: y) last
03 = y(z1J3) if U(z, B3) > U(x, 03) : put z first ,  y last
For k ..t 1 2 3 Ok = Ok so 0 = (0-123 01 iP 03) iP 02 and 03 are reshuffles ofI ' '  ' ' ' ' . ' ' 
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B1, (J2, (J3 about x = f( B). 
Let 01 = Yfjl if U(x, 81) > U(w,81) : put y first, (w: z) last
01 = z(w("81)) if U(w, 81) > U(x,81) : put w first, y second, z last
Let 02 = x(p if U(x,82) > U(y,82) : z first ,  (y: w) last
02 = w("("82)) if U(y,82) > U(x, 82) : y first, z second, w last
Let 03 = w(p if U(x, 83) > U(z, 83) : put w first, (z: y) last
03 = y(z(w83)) if U(z, 83) > U(x, 83) : put z first, w second, y last
Since f}k are reshuffles for k = l , 2, 3  by lemma (le), o(l , O) = o(l, B), 
o(2, 0) = o(2,8) and o(3, 0) = o(3, B). Since o(l, 0) = o(l, B), C(o(l, 0), li°1) = C(o(l, 8), 0i). 
By construction, y E o(l, 11), and 01 ranks y first or second. If 01 ranks y first then
y = C(o(l, 0), 0i). If 01 ranks y second, then U(w, 81) > U(x, 111), and x E f(8), implies
that w r/.: f(ll), and w r/.: o(l , 11) . Hence, y = C(o(l, O), ii1). Similarly w = C(o(3 , il), B3) and
z = C( o(2, 0), B2). 
By lemma (la) , y = f(ft1, B1), z = f(e-2,ii°2) and w = f(il-3, 03). But 01 E r(w, 01), 
01 E r(z,01), 02 E r(w, 02) 02 E r(y,02), and 03 E r(z, 03), 03 E r(y,03); hence, by lemma
(lb), y = f(ir123, 81, o2, 83), z = f(ir123, 81, iJ2 , e3) and w = f(ir123, 81, iJ2, e3), which is a
contradiction, since y, z, and w are distinct.
If the y, z, and w are not distinct, then the conditions of lemma (ld) are observed
and the lemma still follows. 0. 
Given the previous lemmas, the proof of the theorem is straightforward. 
Proof of Theorem 6. 6.
2A( 11)3, . .  ., n - lA( ll)n. By
lA(ll)n =? � nA(ll)l. Hence,
Without loss of generality, suppose that lA( 11)2, 
the transitivity of A( · ) , lA( ll)n. By asymmetry, 
� nA(ll)l, and A(ll) is acyclic. D. 
wp I dux2-3 3
LI. Appendix D 
PROPOSITION 7.2. If preferences satisfy SIP then the domain of preferences is rich. 
Proof Without loss of generality let B1 > B2 > · · · > Bk. The definition of rich and of 
U( · ) implies:
i) "' -(a · - b ·)B · > 0 =? "' -(a · - b )B · > 0 andLi 3  J J J - L- 3  J J J - ' 
ii) "' -(a · - b ·)B · > 0 =? "' -(a · - b ·)B > 0 Li 3  J J J W 3  J J J • 
i) and ii) are true for a1 and bm such that l :::; m and B1 > Bm .
Choose 7J such that 7J1 > 7Jm and 7Jm > 7J j> forj oF l or m. 
Then for preferences to be rich, any cP E .A, where cP assigns the p1h slot, must
satisfy: 
a) a/11 - cPBP 2 0 =? a17J1 - cP7JP 2 0, and
b) bmBm - cPBP 2: 0 =? bm7Jm - cP7JP 2 0.
Both the right-hand side and left-hand side of a) are true for l :::; p, and both the right­
hand side and left-hand side of b) are true for m :::; p. Therefore, a) and b) hold for 
any c E .A, so .A is rich. D.
15. Appendix E
In this appendix we provide the conditions sufficient for a Pareto optimal 
outcome. We do this by first providing conditions for a SCF to be S-IWM*, which is 
similar to DHMs notion of independent weak monotonicity. Our definition S-IWM* 
does not involve coalitions and is used only to obtain intermediate results. We first 
provide these definitions and then prove the proposition. 
DEFINITION19 E.l. A SCF f: eN >-> .A satisfies independent weak monotonicity
{IWM} if VB E E>N, VC c;;; N, V 7J0 E IT .  08\ and V{a,b} c;;; .A such that a E f(B), and
' E  
(Vi E C)[U(a, Bi) 2: U(b, Bi) =? U(a,7Ji) > U(b,7Ji)]; it must be that b (:. f(e-0,7J0). 
19 This is the definition of IWM that appears in DHM. Neither Laffont and Mask.in (1982) or Maskin (1986) 
have definitions of IWM. 
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DEFINITION E.2. A SCF f: GN >-t .A satisfies S-IWM* if V {O, B} c GN, and
V {a, b} C .A such that:
1) a E J(O), and 2) (Vi E N)[U(a, O') ::>: U(b, O') =? U(a, B') ::>: U(b, B')] ;  then b rf_ J(B).
We first provide a lemma that is a similar to lemma B.l in Appendix B. 
LEMMA E.3. If preferences satisfy SIP, and if a SCF f: GN >-t .A satisfies IPM, and
is noncorruptible, a E J(O) , c E J(7Ji, o-t and a i c, then U(a,7J') < U(c,7J') and
U( c, O') < U( a, O'). 
Proof Suppose our hypothesis holds; then noncorruptibility and a i c imply that
a' i c'; lemma B . l  is then applied to obtain the result. D.
As in lemma B .1 if preferences do not satisfy SIP in the previous lemma then
U(a, B') ::; U(c,B') and U(c, O') ::; U(a, O') .  The difference between lemma B . l  and the
previous lemma is that in lemma B . l ,  a' i ci and noncorruptibility is not a condition.
In the previous lemma a i c, and noncorruptibility implies a' i c'. 
LEMMA E.4. If preferences satisfy SIP, then if a SCF is noncorruptible and satisfies 
IPM, it is S-IWM*. 
Proof Suppose that f: GN >-t .A satisfies the hypothesis of the lemma; then for
O, B E GN, a E .A., such that a E f(O), and (Vi E N)(Vb E .A., b # a) 
[U(a,O') 2'. U(b, O') =? U(a,B') 2'. U(b, Bi)], but b E J(B); we will show that this is a
contradiction. 
Suppose that c E J(B1,e-1), for some c E .A.. If c i a, then by noncorruptibility,
SIP, IPM and lemma E.3, U(a, 01) < U(c, 01) and U(c, 01) < U(a, 01) .  But
[U( a, e1) ::: U( c, (11) =} U( a, 01) ::: U( c, 01 )], so it must be that c = a, and a E J(B', 0-1 ) . 
Similarly, a E f(B', 02, o-l, 2), continuing iteratively,
it is single-valued; hence b rf_ f(B). 
The main proposition is stated and proven below. 
a E j(B). But f is a SCF, so
D. 
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PROPOSITION 8-3. If preferences satisfy SIP, then if a SCF is noncorruptible, satisfies 
IPM, and CS, it is strong Pareto optimal (SPO). 
Proof Suppose that f: eN >--+ A satisfies the hypothesis but that f is not SPO. Then
there exist a 7J E eN and a pair {a, b} � A, such that Vi E N, U( a, 7J') 2: U(b, 7Ji), and
b E J(7J). Since preferences satisfy SIP, either a =  b or there exists a j E K  such that
U(a,7Ji) > U(b,7Ji). By CS, there exists a () E 8N such that a E f(B). By the previous
lemma, f satisfies S-IWM*. Since (Vi E N)[U(a,B') 2: U(b,B') =;. U(a,7J') 2: U(b,7J')J 
and a E f(B), S-IWM* implies that b f/c f(B), a contradiction. D. 
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